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Abstract
This paper suggests that the marriage market conditions, summarized by the
sex ratio, can be used to test the unitary and the non-unitary household models
and that the test may be combined with the income pooling test to produce more
reliable inferences. Using data from Indonesia, this paper conducts the combined
test by estimating the e®ects of the provincial sex ratio and the parents' nonla-
bor incomes/premarital assets on Indonesian household's investment in children's
education. I ¯nd that in urban areas the sex ratio has a strong positive e®ect on
education expenditures, but not in rural areas. Being consistent to the sex ratio
e®ect estimates, the income pooling hypothesis is mostly rejected in urban areas,
but not in rural areas. In addition, premarital assets are found to have signi¯cant
e®ects on investment in children's education in urban areas, but not in rural areas.
I ¯nd that the estimation results are robust against alternative de¯nitions of the
sex ratio and additional controls for women's fertility choices and community-level
income/wealth di®erences.
1 Introduction
Traditionally a family is regarded as a single decision-making unit in the economy. The
traditional unitary household model abstracts away the di®erences among the family
members and treats a household as if it is a collection of identical individuals or it is
governed by the dictatorial householder who optimizes, subject to the `pooled' budget
constraint. More recently, however, models that preserve intra-family di®erences are
advanced and appear to be gaining popularity. Such models treat a household as a
1collection of individuals with divergent preferences and individual resources and view
intrahousehold resource allocations as bargaining outcomes (McElroy and Horney 1981),
or as Pareto-e±cient outcomes reached through some (unspeci¯ed) collective decision-
making processes (Chiappori 1988).
The unitary and the non-unitary household models have vastly di®erent implications
on social policies, in particular on e®ects of transfer programs. The unitary model sug-
gests that, controlling for the total amount of transfers, the identity of the bene¯ciary
should have no e®ect on household consumptions, because all the household members' re-
sources are pooled. The non-unitary models suggest otherwise, because the change of the
recipient's individual resources will shift the household members' bargaining powers, and
subsequently the household consumption decisions. For example, the non-unitary mod-
els suggest that welfare bene¯ts have di®erent e®ects on children's welfare depending on
which parent receives them, while the unitary model suggest that as long as the amount
itself does not change, who receives them should not make any di®erence1. Furthermore,
according to the non-unitary models, policies that change the social environment where
the value of the household members' outside options is determined|for example, divorce
laws|may change the intrahousehold resource allocations (Chiappori et al. 2002).
Considering the theoretical as well as the practical importance of the issue, one may
¯nd only ¯tting that there are many studies that test validity of the competing house-
hold models. Although their data sets and variables of interest di®er, most of the early
empirical studies focus on testing whether nonlabor incomes of household members are
pooled for household consumptions. For example, Thomas (1990, 1994) tests whether in
Brazil the mother's and the father's nonlabor incomes have di®erent impacts on children's
health and nutritional intake. Schultz (1990) tests whether in Thailand unearned income
and transfers received by the husband and the wife have di®erent e®ects on female labor
supply and fertility. Du°o (2000) tests whether in South Africa pensions received by
women and men have di®erent e®ects on children's height and weight.
As pointed out elsewhere (Thomas et al. 2002), however, in many cases it is di±cult to
2defend exogeneity of the nonlabor income variables, the critical assumption which validity
of the income pooling tests rests on. Pensions, for example, are likely to be the outcome
of the intertemporal household resource allocation decisions. Despite that the problem is
well known, it is di±cult to solve it because the incidence of purely exogenous nonlabor
incomes|for example, lottery winnings|is extremely rare and the proper instruments|
some variables which determine the household members' nonlabor incomes but not the
household resource allocation decisions|seem to be nonexistent in most data sets. Facing
the problem in using the nonlabor income variables, several studies suggest that the value
of premarital assets may be used instead of the amount of current nonlabor incomes,
assuming that it is exogenous to postmarital household decisions. For example, Thomas
et al. (2002) test whether in Indonesia resources brought to marriage by the husband
and the wife have any e®ect on the children's health, controlling for the current economic
status. Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) estimate the e®ects of the husband's and the
wife's assets at marriage on the shares of the food, health, education, child clothing, and
tobacco expenditures in the total household expenditures using data from Bangladesh,
Ethiopia, Indonesia, and South Africa. It should be noted that inferences based on this
alternative are valid only if the size of the assets brought to the marriage is not determined
through a premarital bargaining between the bride and the groom or if the postmarital
bargainings are uncorrelated with the premarital bargainings.
Though most widely used, the income pooling hypothesis is not the only testable
implication that can be used to test the unitary household model against the non-unitary
models. The non-unitary household models suggest that any factor outside the household
that shifts individual household members' household bargaining powers or Pareto weights
in the household|called \extrahousehold environmental parameters (EEPs)" by McElroy
and Horney (1981) and McElroy (1990) and \distribution factors" by Chiappori et al.
(2002)|such as the sex ratio in the marriage market, should change the intrahousehold
resource allocation in a predictable way. The unitary model predicts that they should
have no e®ect at all (McElroy 1990, Chiappori et al. 2002).
3There are several empirical studies on intrahousehold allocations that exploit the im-
plication and test whether the sex ratio has any impact on household consumptions. As
far as I know, all the studies use data from the US and focus on women's labor supply2.
Grossbard-Shechtman (1993), using data from the US Census in 1930 and in 1980, ¯nds
that the city sex ratio is negatively correlated with the labor force participation rate of
married women. Grossbard-Shechtman and Neide®er (1997), using a microsample from
the 1990 Census, ¯nd that the sex ratio in metropolitan areas is negatively correlated
with the likelihood of local women's being in the labor force or with local women's work-
ing hours. Chiappori et al. (2002) ¯nd that, using data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) of 1988 and the Census of 1990, the state sex ratio is negatively cor-
related with married women's labor supply but positively correlated with married men's
labor supply. Angrist (2002) studies the impact of the immigration °ow into America on
the marriage market of the second generation in early twentieth century and ¯nds that
the increased sex ratio reduces female labor force participation and tilts the balance of
household bargaining power toward women. These studies provide evidence that the local
sex ratio, whose increase should contribute to strengthening wives' bargaining power, has
a signi¯cant e®ect on the intrahousehold resource allocation to the expected direction.
The linkage between the sex ratio and household decisions, however, has not been studied
so far in other areas than labor supply.
The two approaches to the research on intrahousehold resource allocations have been
taken separately so far. The theory, however, does not suggest that the two tests|the
income pooling and the EEP e®ect tests|should be done separately. It does suggest, to
the contrary, that the two tests be combined to be a more rigorous test of the household
models. An important advantage of the combined test over the separate ones is that cross-
checks of the two test results for whether they lead to consistent inferences regarding the
household behavior will make the conclusions drawn from the combined test more reliable
than those from the separate tests.
Adopting the strategy of combining the two tests in this paper, I estimate the ef-
4fects of the provincial sex ratio and of the mother's and the father's nonlabor incomes
on household resources allocated to children's education in Indonesia. In another speci-
¯cation I replace the nonlabor incomes with the parents' premarital assets. Using three
di®erent samples, I estimate the e®ects of the sex ratio, the nonlabor incomes, and the
premarital assets on children's school enrollment status and education expenditures on
the individual and on the household level, controlling for the child's and the parents'
characteristics and the communities' education infrastructure. The results are used to
test validity of the household models separately for the urban and the rural area.
The estimation results show that in urban areas the sex ratio has strong positive e®ects
on the households' education expenditures, but not in rural areas. The income pooling is
rejected mostly in urban areas, but never rejected in rural areas. The estimation results
are found to be robust even if the e®ects of the sex ratio on mothers' fertility choices and
the average household income and asset holdings of communities are taken into account
in estimations. It is also found that controlling for the current household income and
assets, the parents' premarital assets, when they replace the nonlabor income variables,
have signi¯cant e®ects on urban households' investment in children's education, but not
on rural households' investment. Note the consistency of the estimation results|in urban
areas, they all agree in rejecting the unitary household model, while in rural areas they
agree in not rejecting the unitary model. I also ¯nd evidence that in Indonesia both the
mother and the father prefer educating sons to educating daughters.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the unitary and
the non-unitary household models and discusses their empirical implications this study is
based on. Section 3 describes the data and how some key variables are constructed. Then
Section 4 presents and discusses the estimation results. The conclusion of this paper is
provided in Section 5.
52 The Models of Intrahousehold Resource Allocation
and Children's Education
Think of a household that consists of the father, the mother, and K children. For the
time being, let us think of the household as a unit whose decision is made by only one of




where c is the pooled household consumption, lf the father's leisure, lm the mother's
leisure, and q the average quality of the children3. The children's average quality is
determined by the following `children's quality production function:'
q = Q(e1;e2;:::;eK;tf;tm;h1;h2;:::;hK); (2)
where e1;:::;eK are the goods input for the child's education, tf and tm are the father's
and the mother's time inputs, and h1;:::;hK are the children's quality endowment. The
budget constraint is
If + Im + wf(T ¡ lf ¡ tf) + wm(T ¡ lm ¡ tm) =
K X
i=1
peiei + pcc; (3)
where If and Im are the parents' nonlabor incomes, wf and wm the wages, T is the total
available time, and pe1;:::;peK;pc are the prices. The householder's problem is to choose
c, lf, lm, tf, tm, and e1;:::;eK to maximize the utility (1) subject to the children's quality
production function and the pooled budget constraint. Our interest lies in the optimal
choice of ei for i = 1;2;:::;K, e¤




i = f(If + Im;wf;wm;p
0;h
0;K); (4)
6where p is the (K +1)£1 price vector and h is the K £1 children's quality endowment
vector. This function shows that according to the unitary household model, the parents'
nonlabor incomes are pooled.
Now let us turn our attention to the non-unitary models in which one parent's utility
function may be di®erent from the other's. The father's and the mother's utility is a
function of his or her own consumption and leisure, the spouse's consumption and leisure,
and the household's public consumption. One element of the public household goods is
the children's average quality. We can write the father's (j = f) and the mother's (j = m)




for j = f;m where c0 is the public household goods other than the children's quality,
cf and lf are the father's consumption and leisure, and cm and lm are the mother's
consumption and leisure.
There are two well-known models that explain how the ¯nal household decisions are
made between the two individuals of di®erent preferences. One is the Nash household
bargaining model (McElroy and Horney 1981, McElroy 1990) and the other is the Pareto-
e±cient household model (Chiappori 1988, Chiappori et al. 2002). While the assumptions
of the two models di®er, the empirical implications derived from the two models to be
tested in this paper are identical. Since the empirical implications can be derived more
directly from the Nash household bargaining model than from the other, the bargaining
model is explained in more detail here than the Pareto-e±cient model is.
If the parents' marriage dissolved, the father and the mother would draw utility from
their private consumption goods, own leisure, and the portion of the household public
goods allocated to them by law or the social custom. If they were not married, the father






7where qj and c0j for j = f;m is the amount of the public goods j would keep if their
marriage dissolved, subject to the individual budget constraint:





peiei + pc(c0j + cj): (7)
The father's and the mother's maximum utility level that would be obtained if their








for j = f;m where ®j is the vector of variables that a®ect the maximum value of utility
attainable by j outside of the marriage, so-called extrahousehold environmental parame-
ters (EEPs). The EEPs certainly include the marriage market situations. One important
parameter is the sex ratio, the number of males divided by that of females. Once we
view the marriage as the bargaining outcome between a man and a woman and apply
the sequential bargaining model of Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), we can show that as
the number of males relative to that of the females increases, the husband is willing to
concede a larger share of the gains from the marriage with the wife. It implies that, as the
sex ratio increases, the wife's expected maximum utility outside the marriage increases,










where r denotes the the sex ratio in the marriage market.

















8subject to the combined budget constraint
If + Im + (wf + wm)T =
K X
i=1
peiei + pc(c0 + cf + cm) + wf(lf + tf) + wm(lm + tm) (11)
and the children's quality production function (2). By solving the utility maximization






The equation (12) derived from the Nash household bargaining model is di®erent from
the equation (4) derived from the unitary household utility model in two aspects. First,
the equation (12) implies an incomplete income pooling while the equation (4) a complete
income pooling. Since the mother's and the father's nonlabor income directly a®ects
their respective threat points in the household bargaining, they have di®erent e®ects on
the household demand for goods. As the mother's (father's) nonlabor income increases,
the household consumption becomes more aligned to the mother's (father's) preference,
everything else equal. Second, the equation (12) implies that the EEPs have e®ects on the
demand while the equation 4 does not. McElroy and Horney (1981, equation 13) show that
if EEPs change to increase the mother's threat point and lower the father's threat point,
the household consumption shifts to the goods valued relatively more by the mother than
by the father. Therefore, if the sex ratio in the marriage market increases and the child
quality is valued more (less) relative to other goods by the mother than by the father, the
model predicts that the demand for ei will increase (decrease). This implication, when
it is combined with the incomplete income pooling, leads to the `consistency' condition.
That is, an increase of the mother's nonlabor income and an increase of the sex ratio
should have the same qualitative e®ect, though they may be di®erent quantitatively, on
the child quality demand, because both changes increase the mother's utility outside the
marriage. On the other hand, the consistency condition implies that the sex ratio and
9the father's nonlabor income should have the opposite qualitative e®ects.
The Pareto-e±cient household model, the other non-unitary household model, does
not assume any speci¯c intrahousehold decision making mechanism as the household bar-
gaining model does, but assumes that the intrahousehold resource allocation is Pareto-
e±cient. Therefore, for any given (wf;wm;If;Im;p0;h0;K;®f;®m), there exists a weight-
ing factor ¹(wf;wm;If;Im;p0; h0;K;®f;®m) belonging to [0;1] such that the chosen levels
of (lf;tf;lm;tm;c0;cf;cm;e1;:::;eK) maximize the following `collective' utility:
¹u
f + (1 ¡ ¹)u
m (13)
subject to the equations (2) and (11). This leads to the demand function for ei for








Note that this equation, like the equation (4), implies an incomplete income pooling and
the e®ect of the EEPs (distribution factors) on the demand for ei. The EEPs a®ect
the demand by shifting the Pareto weight. If the individual preference is egotistic, the
consistency condition is implied (Chiappori et al. 2002).
3 Data
The samples used for estimations in this study are drawn from the Second Indonesian
Family Life Survey data of 1997 (IFLS{2). The IFLS is a longitudinal socioeconomic and
health survey of Indonesian households representing about 83 percent of the Indonesian
population living in 13 of the nation's 26 provinces. Two waves of the IFLS data, col-
lected in 1993 and 1997, are now available. The IFLS provides us with rich socioeconomic
information on individuals and households, including adults' nonlabor income, children's
school enrollment status, household-level education expenditures, and individual-level ed-
10ucation expenditure for selected 7 to 15 year-old children. In addition to the individual
and household information, the IFLS collects community (village or township) informa-
tion, for example, information on transportation, industries, schools, and hospitals4.
The sex ratio variable used in the study is computed using the provincial population
counts from Indonesia's Population Census in 20005. In the regression analyses whose
results are reported in this article, the single-age sex ratio at the father's age is used.
That is, for a household k in province ¼ with the father who is ¿ years old at the time of





where M¼;¿ is the number of ¿-year old males in province ¼ as counted in the Population
Census of 2000 and F¼;¿ is the number of ¿-year old females in province ¼ in the Census.





tried, but the estimation results remain almost the same so that they are not reported in
this article. I also ¯nd similar results from estimations done using sex ratios computed
with the community population size reported in the IFLS{2 data instead of those from
the Census6.
The nonlabor income variable used in the study is the sum of pension, scholarship,
insurance claims, lottery winnings, and other nonlabor income received in the previous
year by the respondents to the survey. Gifts or transfers received are not counted, because
they are likely to depend on the economic status and needs of the household, and therefore
clearly endogenous.
Three di®erent samples are extracted from the IFLS{2 data. The ¯rst sample com-
prises of the household heads' children 7 to 24 years old. The children's school enrollment
status and other personal characteristics are drawn from the household rosters. This sam-
ple is used to estimate the e®ects of the provincial sex ratio and parental nonlabor incomes
on children's school enrollment status. The second sample is a subset of the ¯rst sam-
11ple that comprises of the household heads' children 7 to 16 years old|7 to 14 years old
except for 6 children|on whom much detailed survey was carried out in the IFLS{2.
The detailed survey provides us with information on the children's health status and the
expenditures spent for their education in the 1997{1998 school year. The expenditure
variable is the sum of the school fees, expenditure on school supplies, transportation and
pocket money, and other school related expenses. It should be noted that the IFLS{2 col-
lected the detailed information on children for up to only three children in each household
who are (supposed to be) 7 to 15 years old. Since the education expenditure information is
available only for a subset of children who are relatively young|mostly of primary school
age|I complement the analysis of individual-level education expenditures with an anal-
ysis of household-level education expenditures. The household expenditure information
is obtained from the questionnaire on household consumption. For the household-level
analysis, a sample of households that have at least one member who is 7 to 24 years old
is used. The households included in the three samples share the following characteris-
tics: the household head is male and married, and both he and his spouse are 25 years
old or older7. Observations that have missing information on any necessary variable are
excluded from the samples.
[Table 1 here.]
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the dependent variables|children's school
enrollment status and the individual and the household education expenditures|and
some key explanatory variables|sex ratio, mother's and father's nonlabor incomes, child's
age and sex|used in the estimations whose results are reported in the panel (A) of
Table 2. The upper panel (A) shows the statistics for observations from urban areas and
the lower panel (B) for observations from rural areas. Comparing the statistics across
the two panels, we can spot urban-rural di®erences, somewhat expected, in children's
education. Urban children are more likely to be enrolled in school than rural children|
74 percent of the urban children are enrolled in a school, while 69 percent of the rural
12children are. Urban households also spend much more for their children's education than
rural households. The individual education expenditure data indicates that the urban
households spend, on average, twice as much as the rural households per child|mostly of
elementary school age|on education. On the household level, the rural households spend
about one third of what the urban households spend for children's education. While the
urban households and the rural households appear to spend greatly di®erent amount
of money on children's education in absolute terms, in relative terms to the household
earnings, the rural-urban di®erence in education expenditures is a lot smaller|the median
ratio of the household education expenditure to the household earnings is 9.6 percent for
the urban households and 7.0 percent for the rural households (not shown).
The average provincial sex ratio is slightly slightly higher than 1.0. Although not
shown in the table, the distribution of the sex ratio ranges wide from .7 to 1.6. Urban
parents are likely to have higher nonlabor income than their rural counterparts. Urban
mothers' average nonlabor income ranges from 18,000 to 48,000 rupiah a year depending
on the sample, while rural mother's from 3,000 to 5,000 rupiah only. Fathers tend to
receive higher nonlabor incomes than mothers. Urban fathers' average nonlabor income
ranges from 95,000 to 216,000 rupiah a year, while rural father's from 56,000 to 66,000
rupiah. It should be noted here that the vast majority of the parents do not have any
nonlabor income. 97 percent of the urban mothers, 93 percent of the urban fathers, 99
percent of the rural mothers, and 97 percent of the rural fathers report zero nonlabor
income.
4 Estimation and Results
4.1 Empirical Model
Using the three samples described in the previous section, I estimate three equations: the
children's school enrollment equation, the individual school expenditure equation, and the
13household school expenditure equation. Let e¤
ki denote the parents' `desired' education





ki = ¯0 + ¯1rk + ¯2Ikm + ¯3Ikf + ¯4Hki + ¯5Xkm + ¯6Xkf + ¯7Zk + ¯8Sk + "ki; (16)
where rk is the provincial sex ratio at the father's age computed by equation (15), Ikm
and Ikf are the mother's and the father's nonlabor income, Hki is the vector of the child's
characteristics (age, age squared, and sex), Xkm and Xkf are the vectors of the mother's
and the father's characteristics (age, age squared, and education), Zk is the vector of
household characteristics (number of household members by age groups|0 to 6, 7 to 12,
13 to 18, 19 to 55, and 56 or older), Sk is the vector of community characteristics indicating
the community's educational infrastructure (the number of primary, junior secondary and
senior secondary schools and the total population size), and "ki is the random factor that
is uncorrelated across households but may be correlated within the household. Note that
here I assume that the choice of education expenditure for child i does not depend on
other children's quality endowment and that the child i's quality endowment is controlled
for by the child's and the parents' observed characteristics. Wages and price di®erences
of education goods are controlled for by the parents' characteristics, the urban dummy,
and the community characteristics.
According to the unitary household model, ¯1 = 0 and ¯2 = ¯3 should hold. The
household bargaining model and the Pareto-e±cient household model, on the other hand,
reject the implications of the unitary household model. As discussed in section 2, the
household bargaining model demands consistency between the sex ratio and the parental
nonlabor income parameters, that is, ¯1¯2 > 0 and ¯1¯3 < 0.
The enrollment status of a child is determined by whether the parents' desired edu-









where aki = 1 if the child i in household k is enrolled in a school, and aki = 0 otherwise.
Assuming that "ki is normally distributed, probit model is used to estimate the parameters
of the equation (16) using the sample of 7 to 24 year children.
The parameters of the equation (16) can be also estimated by using education ex-
penditure data, assuming the desired education expenditure is equal to the observed
education expenditure. Two equations of education expenditures, one for individual-level
expenditures using the sample of 7 to 16 year old children and the other for household-
level expenditures using the sample of households that have one or more 7 to 24 year old
members, are estimated. Since education expenditures are observed only for children en-
rolled in a school, sample-selection corrected education expenditure equation is estimated
by Heckman's method for the individual-level expenditures. For identi¯cation purposes,
the sample selection equation includes nineteen dummy variables indicating whether a
child su®ers from various disease symptoms|fever, nausea, diarrhea, and infections in
body parts|in addition to the variables in the expenditure amount equation. As the
disease symptom variables are available only for those in the second sample, they are not
included in the general enrollment equation (17) estimated using the household roster
information. The equation of household-level education expenditures, equivalent to the
aggregation of equation (16) across children within households, is estimated by OLS.
In order to investigate urban-rural di®erences in parents' investment in children's
education, the three equations described above are estimated separately for the urban
sample and the rural sample. Statistical tests reject equality of the parameters estimated
using the two di®erent samples in most speci¯cations.
154.2 Estimation Results
[Table 2 here.]
Table 2 shows the estimated coe±cients of the sex ratio, the mother's nonlabor income,
and the father's nonlabor income in the three equations for the urban and the rural
households. The left panel (A) of the table shows the coe±cient estimates using the
setup of equation (16) and the right panel (B) shows the coe±cient estimates using
an augmented setup that has the current household earnings and the asset holdings as
additional explanatory variables. Panels (A) and (B) are also divided into the upper
and the lower subpanels showing the estimation results for the urban households and
the rural households respectively. For all the coe±cient estimates, standard errors are
adjusted for heteroscedasticity and for possible correlations among children within the
same household8.
The ¯rst columns of the panels (A) and (B) show the coe±cient estimates of the
school enrollment equation for the household heads' 7{to{24{year old children. In the
both panels (A) and (B), the estimated sex ratio coe±cient is positive and statistically
insigni¯cant at any conventional level for the urban households, while the coe±cient for
the rural households is negative and statistically signi¯cant at the 5 percent level for the
rural households. The estimated coe±cients imply that, at the sample mean, an increase
of the local sex ratio by 0.1|which is approximately its standard deviation|raises the
urban children's school enrollment probability by 0.3 percentage points, but decreases the
rural children's by 2 percentage points.
In urban areas both parents' nonlabor incomes are estimated to have positive e®ects
on children's school enrollment probability. The magnitudes of the e®ects are, however,
quite di®erent. An increase of the mother's nonlabor income by one million rupiah a
year is estimated to increase the school enrollment probability, at the sample mean, by 4
percent, while the same increase of the father's nonlabor income increases the probability
by only 0.4 percent. The statistical test rejects equality of the father's and the mother's
16nonlabor income coe±cients, or the income pooling hypothesis, at the 1 percent level in
the panel (A) and at the 5 percent level in the panel (B) for the urban households. In
rural areas, on the other hand, the mother's nonlabor income coe±cient is estimated to
be negative and the father's positive. However, neither of them is statistically signi¯cant
even at the 10 percent level. For rural households, equality of the parental nonlabor
income coe±cients is not rejected at any conventional level.
The joint hypothesis that the sex ratio has no e®ect and the parents' incomes are
pooled is rejected at the 10 percent or the smaller levels both in the urban and the rural
areas. In urban areas it is rejected at the 2 percent and at the 8 percent levels in the
panels (A) and (B) respectively; in rural areas at the 7 percent and at the 10 percent
levels. The signs of the sex ratio coe±cient and the maternal nonlabor income coe±cient
seem to suggest that the mother's household bargaining power is correlated with the
children's school enrollment probability positively in urban areas, but negatively in rural
areas.
The second column of each panel shows the coe±cient estimates of the individual
education expenditure equation for children 7 to 16 years old. The sex ratio coe±cient
estimates are all positive. According to the estimates in the panel (A), however, the
sex ratio has much greater e®ect on the education expenditure in urban areas than in
rural areas|an increase of the provincial sex ratio by 0.1 increases the annual education
expenditure for an urban child by 29,000 rupiah, or 15 percent from the sample mean,
but for a rural child only by 3,400 rupiah, or 4 percent from the mean. Note also that
the sex ratio coe±cient is statistically signi¯cant at the 1 percent level in urban areas in
both panels, while, in rural areas, statistically insigni¯cant at any popular level in the
panel (A) and signi¯cant only at the 10 percent level in the other panel.
As in the enrollment equation, the income pooling hypothesis is rejected soundly
in urban areas. The mother's nonlabor income coe±cient is positive and statistically
signi¯cant at the 1 percent level, while the father's nonlabor income coe±cient is slightly
negative but statistically insigni¯cant. In rural areas neither parent's nonlabor income
17coe±cient is statistically signi¯cant and the income pooling hypothesis is not rejected.
The joint test of the sex ratio coe±cient and the income pooling hypothesis rejects the
null only in urban areas. The unitary household model is, therefore, rejected in urban
areas, but not in rural areas.
The last columns show the coe±cient estimates of the household-level education ex-
penditure equation. The sex ratio coe±cient estimation results are similar to those of the
individual expenditure equation. That is, in urban areas, the sex ratio coe±cient is posi-
tive and statistically signi¯cant, while in rural areas it is small, positive, but statistically
insigni¯cant. The correlation of the sex ratio and the household education expenditure is
strong in urban areas|an increase of the sex ratio by 0.1 is associated with an increase
of the household education expenditure by 130,000 to 156,000 rupiah a year or about 20
percent of the average expenditure. Unlike other equations, however, the income pooling
hypothesis is rejected in neither area. As with the individual expenditure equation, note
that the joint test rejects the unitary household model in urban areas, but not in rural
areas.
Collating the estimation results in Table 2 described above, we ¯nd that the unitary
household model is rejected in urban areas in every speci¯cation. The estimated sex ratio
coe±cient is positive in urban areas without an exception and the mother's nonlabor
income coe±cient estimate is always positive and larger than the father's nonlabor income
coe±cient estimate. The estimation results, therefore, strongly suggest that in urban
areas the mother's household bargaining power has positive e®ects on the amount of
household resources devoted to the children's education, while the father's has little or
negative e®ects on the investment in children's education. On the other hand, in rural
areas the unitary household model is rejected only in the enrollment equation. The
estimated sign of the sex ratio coe±cient is negative in the enrollment equation, but
positive in the other two equations. The mother's nonlabor income seems to be negatively
correlated with the investment in children's education, but neither parent's nonlabor
income coe±cient is statistically signi¯cant in any speci¯cation.
18As discussed before, the household bargaining model demands consistency between
the sex ratio and the parental nonlabor income parameters. There are two consistency
conditions. One is that the sex ratio coe±cient and the mother's nonlabor income co-
e±cient should have the same sign. The other is that the sex ratio coe±cient and the
father's nonlabor income coe±cient should have the opposite sign. In urban areas where
the unitary household model is rejected and the sex ratio and the mother's nonlabor
income coe±cients are estimated with some precision, the ¯rst condition seems to be
satis¯ed in all equations. The second condition is, however, satis¯ed only in the indi-
vidual expenditure equation. In rural areas, on the other hand, the ¯rst and the second
conditions are met in the enrollment equation in which the unitary household model is
rejected. In other equations where the unitary model is not rejected, the conditions are
not met in general. It is notable that the ¯st consistency condition, which can be assessed
more reliably than the second condition since the father's nonlabor income coe±cient is
never estimated with enough precision, is satis¯ed whenever the unitary household model
is rejected.
So far the sex ratio coe±cient has been interpreted as the e®ect of the mother's
household bargaining power on the parents' household resource allocation decisions for
children's education. However, one may object to such interpretation of the coe±cient
on the following two grounds. One is that the households' fertility choices may be in-
adequately controlled for in estimations. If there is a negative relationship between the
mother's bargaining power and the mother's `desired' fertility, we may ¯nd a positive re-
lationship between the sex ratio and the investment in `existing' children's education, not
because of the direct e®ect of the mother's bargaining power on education expenditures,
but because of the fertility choices. The other is that the sex ratio may be correlated
with income di®erences across communities which may be insu±ciently controlled for.
Considering that men, who are main earners in households, are likely to be attracted to
areas where they can receive high wages, the sex ratio is likely to be positively correlated
with the level of local income and asset holdings. Therefore, the positive relationship
19between the sex ratio and expenditures on children's education may be nothing but the
income e®ect.
The two points raised above are actually backed up by the data. Controlling for the
parents' education and age, the number of existing male and female children, and the
urban area dummy, a probit analysis suggests that an increase of the provincial sex ratio
by 0.1 decreases the probability that the mother wants another child by 1.1 percentage
points. The relationship of the provincial sex ratio with the local income and wealth
level is very strong. Controlling for the father's age, age squared, and education level and
the urban area dummy, an increase of the provincial sex ratio by 0.1 is estimated to be
associated with an increase of the average household earnings of a community by 160,000
rupiah and of the average household assets by 6 million rupiah.
[Table 3 here.]
To examine whether the coe±cients estimated in Table 2 substantially change if the
two points are taken into account in estimations, the three equations are re-estimated,
including in the right hand side the average household earnings and asset holdings of
the community and the dummy variable indicating the mother's desire for another child.
Since the mother's fertility choice is an endogenous variable, the dummy variable is in-
strumented by nine dummies indicating whether the mother can handle activities of daily
living|carrying water, walking, kneeling, etc.|with ease. The estimation results are in
Table 3. Due to collinearity of the individual household earnings and assets with the
average values, the individual household earnings and assets variables are not included in
the equation.
It is found that inclusion of the three new variables reduces the magnitude of the
sex ratio coe±cient in general, especially in urban areas. Restricting the samples to
those included in the estimations in Table 3 and doing OLS estimations without the
three variables, the sex ratio coe±cient (robust standard error) of the three equations is
estimated to be 0.043 (0.075), 0.271 (0.064), and 1.847 (0.464) in urban areas and -0.169
20(0.080), 0.057 (0.026), and -0.0001 (0.132)9. In the IV estimation results of Table 3, those
estimates become 0.001, 0.189, 1.475, -0.176, 0.037, and -0.011 respectively. It implies
that the fertility decisions and the income and wealth di®erences across communities are
partly responsible for the positive e®ect of the sex ratio on the investment in children's
education, particularly in urban areas. It is notable that, although rarely statistically
signi¯cant, all the estimated coe±cients of the `mother wants another child' dummy
variable are negative in both urban and rural areas. Furthermore, the coe±cients of
the average household earnings and asset variables are estimated to be positive in urban
areas.
However, although the estimates di®er in the magnitude, note that the joint statistical
test results regarding the household models we draw from the estimation results in Table 3
are identical to those from the results in Table 2|the unitary household model is rejected
in every speci¯cation in urban areas, but it is rejected, somewhat marginally, only in the
enrollment equation in rural areas. The income pooling hypothesis test results does not
change, either. All in all, the estimation results suggest that although the fertility choices
and the income di®erences are partly responsible for the positive sex ratio coe±cient, they
are not the main reason for it and the interpretation that the sex ratio is an indicator of
the mother's household bargaining power withstand the attempts to falsify it.
One may now raise a question on exogeneity of the nonlabor income variable. As
discussed previously, it is very di±cult to solve the possible endogeneity problem of the
nonlabor income variable. In other studies (Thomas et al. 2002; Quisumbing and Maluc-
cio 2003), the size of individual assets brought to the marriage by the husband and the
wife is suggested as an alternative to the postmarital nonlabor income variable. Following
their lead, in Table 4 I estimate again the three equations with the value of individual
assets at the time of marriage instead of the nonlabor income. The current household
earnings and asset holdings are included in the right hand side to control for their e®ects
on education investment. If the unitary household model is correct, the sex ratio and
the individual premarital asset variables should have no e®ect on the household resource
21allocation, controlling for the household's current earnings and the wealth (Thomas et al.
2002). The estimation results are shown in Table 4.
[Table 4 here.]
Note ¯rst of all that the sex ratio coe±cient estimates in Table 4 are little di®erent
from those in the panel (B) in Table 2. In urban areas the asset coe±cients are jointly
signi¯cant in all equations. On the other hand, in rural areas the parents' assets at the
marriage appear to be largely uncorrelated with the size of household resources devoted
to the children's education. Like the ¯nding from the previous estimations using the
nonlabor income variables, the unitary household model is rejected in urban areas in every
equation, but in rural areas it is rejected, at the 9 percent level, only in the enrollment
equation. The estimation results suggest that in urban areas the education expenditures
increase as the mother's household bargaining power increases, while the relationship
between the parents' bargaining powers and the children's school enrollment is not so
clear. It shows that the overall implication of the equations do not change even if the
parents' nonlabor income variables are replaced with their assets at the marriage variables.
It should be noted, however, that the consistency conditions are violated more fre-
quently in Table 4 than in Table 2. In urban areas, none of the consistency conditions is
satis¯ed in the enrollment equation, while in other equations they seem to hold in general.
In the enrollment equation in the rural areas, on the other hand, none of the conditions
is met. In other equations where the unitary household model is not rejected, the results
are mixed.
The equations estimated so far assume that the parents regard equally the son's and
the daughter's education. Previous studies have found, however, evidence to the contrary,
though not in education. For example, Thomas (1994) ¯nds that the daughter's health
and nutritional status are correlated closer to the mother's education and nonlabor income
than to the father's and that the son's are to the father's than to the mother's. Du°o
(2000) also ¯nds that the pension received by elderly women in South Africa has a large
22impact on health status of girls, but little e®ect on that of boys. Whether the same
pattern holds for the children's education is examined here. I re-estimate the enrollment
status equation and the individual education expenditure equation using the augmented
setup of the panel (B) in Table 2, having in the right hand side the interaction terms
between the child's sex dummy (1 if female, 0 otherwise) and each of the sex ratio, the
maternal nonlabor income, and the paternal nonlabor income variables.
[Table 5 here.]
Table 5 shows the estimation results. In urban areas, the sex ratio and the both par-
ents' nonlabor income are estimated to be all positively correlated with the son's school
enrollment probability. The daughter's school enrollment is, however, negatively corre-
lated with the parents' nonlabor incomes. In the individual expenditure equation, while
both the sex ratio and the mother's nonlabor income have positive relationships with the
the son's and the daughter's education expenditures, their relationship with the son's
education expenditures is estimated to be stronger than that with the daughter's edu-
cation expenditures. The father's nonlabor income is estimated to be weakly correlated
with any child's education expenditures. It implies that in urban areas an increase of
the mother's household bargaining power is likely to increase an investment in the son's
education more than an investment in the daughter's. In rural areas, it appears that
the son's and the daughter's education are treated more or less equally. The interaction
terms are jointly statistically insigni¯cant even at the 10 percent level in each equation.
We can ¯nd an explanation for it in the parents', especially the mother's, needs for old
age security in Indonesia. Lacking social security, most old Indonesians depend on their
own savings, the family's support, and especially the children's transfers for economic
security. The need for old age security is greater for mothers than for fathers, because
mothers are likely to live longer and more likely to be disadvantaged economically in
old ages than fathers. That the mother's strong bargaining power is more positively
correlated with sons' education than with daughters' education should be attributed to
23that the primary economic support for mothers comes from sons, either by cohabitation
or by remittances, rather than from daughters (Park 2003). In a similar vein, Schultz
(1990) ¯nds that the mother's nonlabor income is positively correlated with fertility in
Thailand and attributes it to the mothers' needs for old age security. The ¯nding that
the son's education is preferred to the daughter's in Indonesia coincides with that of
Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003).
5 Conclusion
In this paper I estimate how each parent's household bargaining power a®ects children's
school enrollment status and household education expenditures, using data from the Sec-
ond Indonesian Family Life Survey and the Indonesia's Population Census in 2000. The
estimation results are used to test validity of the unitary and the non-unitary household
models. Instead of measuring an individual's household bargaining power only by his or
her nonlabor income which may be endogenous, in this paper I exploit the implication of
the non-unitary models that the marriage market conditions should a®ect intrahousehold
resource allocations. Thus I estimate the e®ect of the provincial sex ratio (male-female
ratio) in addition to that of each parent's nonlabor income on the household resource
allocation.
I ¯nd that in urban areas the local sex ratio has a strong positive e®ect on the amount
of expenditures on children's education. I also ¯nd that in urban areas the income pooling
hypothesis is rejected in most estimated equations and that the mother's nonlabor income
is more strongly correlated than the father's with the household's investment in children's
education. In rural areas, on the other hand, I ¯nd that the parents' nonlabor incomes
are generally uncorrelated with the children's school enrollment status or the education
expenditures and that the income pooling hypothesis cannot be rejected. Furthermore,
while the provincial sex ratio is negatively correlated with the children's school enrollment,
its e®ects on the education expenditures are found to be statistically insigni¯cant. In sum,
24the unitary household model is rejected in all speci¯cations in urban areas, but in rural
areas it is rejected only in the school enrollment equation. The ¯nding holds even if the
nonlabor income variables are replaced with the values of the parents' individual assets
brought to the marriage. The estimation results change little even when the potential
e®ects of the sex ratio on women's fertility choices and the average income and assets of
the communities are controlled for. I also ¯nd that in urban areas both parents prefer
educating sons to daughters.
The ¯nding of this paper complements other research ¯ndings that the parents' non-
labor incomes have di®erent e®ects on investment in children's welfare. The ¯nding of
this paper and of the previous studies suggest that implementing policies to strengthen
the mother's household bargaining power will improve the children's welfare in many
areas. For example, social welfare bene¯ts can become more e®ective in improving wel-
fare of children by assigning mothers rather than fathers to be the recipients. Expansion
of women's opportunities in the labor market is also likely to improve the children's
education and health. The ¯ndings of this paper, however, indicate that the `mother-
empowering' policies may not work universally. In Indonesia, those policies are likely to
be e®ective only in urban areas. Another evidence found in this study indicates that
while the mother-empowering policies will increase investment in education both of the
son and of the daughter, they are likely to have bigger impact on the son's education
than on the daughter's.
Notes
1For an example from an actual policy, look at Lundberg et al. (1997).
2Rao (1993) studies the e®ect of the sex ratio on the value of dowries in India, which
is not directly related to the household resource allocation we are interested in. Look at
Edlund (2000) and Rao (2000) for a critique on the work.
3For simplicity, following Becker and Lewis (1973), the quality is assumed to be the
25same for all of the children.
4The `community' of IFLS is the enumeration area (EA) de¯ned by the sampling
framework designed by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) and used for
Indonesia's SUSENAS of 1993, a socio-economic survey of about 60,000 households.
5The population counts are obtained from Results of the 2000 Population Census
published by the BPS.
6The unreported estimation results are available upon request from the author.
7A few polygynous households are excluded from the sample.
8Statistical tests strongly reject the homoscedasticity assumption in any setup.
9The full estimation results are available upon request from the author.
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28Table 1: Summary Statistics of Some Key Variables
Enrollment Ind. expenditure HH expenditure
Variable data data data
(A) Urban areas
Enrolled in school (1 if enrolled) :740 { {
Individual education { :187 {
expenditurey £10¡6 (.191)
Household education { { :760
expenditure £10¡6 (1.466)
District sex ratio in 2000 1:046 1:038 1:030
at the father's age (.104) (.102) (.111)
Mother's nonlabor income £10¡6 :030 :018 :048
(.361) (.235) (.454)
Father's nonlabor income £10¡6 :169 :095 :216
(.845) (.589) (.971)
Child's age 14:5 10:6 {
(4.6) (2.3)
Child's sex (1 if female) :479 :490 {
Number of children 2909 1511 {
Number of households 1291 977 1381
Number of communities 165 162 164
(B) Rural areas
Enrolled in school (1 if enrolled) :687 { {
Individual education { :085 {
expenditurey £10¡6 (.089)
Household education { { :254
expenditure £10¡6 (.413)
District sex ratio in 2000 1:029 1:021 1:015
at the father's age (.111) (.107) (.117)
Mother's nonlabor income £10¡6 :003 :005 :004
(.063) (.079) (.080)
Father's nonlabor income £10¡6 :056 :061 :066
(.437) (.455) (.479)
Child's age 13:8 10:4 {
(4.5) (2.2)
Child's sex (1 if female) :484 :508 {
Number of children 3330 1951 {
Number of households 1627 1282 1763
Number of communities 118 118 118
Note: Standard deviations are in the parentheses.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30Table 3: Estimated coe±cient of sex ratio and nonlabor incomes, controlling for the




Variable Enrollment (in million) (in million)
(A) Urban Areas
Sex ratio .001 .189¤ 1.475¤
(.078) (.065) (.520)
Mother's nonlabor income£10¡6 .078¤ .069¤ .207
(.022) (.023) (.153)
Father's nonlabor income£10¡6 .021¤¤ -.002 .045
(.009) (.007) (.086)
Mother wants another child (1 if yes) -.198 -.034 -.628
(.283) (.152) (.847)
Average household earnings£10¡6 .002 .003 .006
(.002) (.002) (.018)
Average household assets£10¡9 .138 .594¤¤¤ 3.205¤¤
(.189) (.307) (1.287)
Income parameter di®erence .058¤ .072¤ .162
(.025) (.023) (.194)
Joint test for sex ratio coe®. & 2.72z 9.69z 5.45z
income pooling hypothesis (.066) (.000) (.004)
No. of observations 2677 1418 1179
(B) Rural Areas
Sex ratio -.176¤¤ .037 -.011
(.088) (.031) (.152)
Mother's nonlabor income£10¡6 -.025 -.023 .011
(.050) (.029) (.054)
Father's nonlabor income£10¡6 .007 .019 -.034
(.014) (.020) (.023)
Mother wants another child (1 if yes) -.144 -.088¤¤ -.095
(.127) (.041) (.207)
Average household earnings£10¡6 .004¤¤ -.001 -.001
(.002) (.001) (.004)
Average household assets£10¡9 .844 .847¤ 1.568
(.607) (.261) (1.040)
Income parameter di®erence -.031 -.042 .045
(.058) (.047) (.068)
Joint test for sex ratio coe®. & 2.53z 0.99z 0.22z
income pooling hypothesis (.080) (.372) (.800)
No. of observations 2966 1775 1455
Note: For other RHS variables, look at the note of Table 2.
Robust standard errors corrected for within-household correlations are in the
parentheses.
¤p < :01; ¤¤:01 · p < :05; ¤¤¤:05 · p < :10: (two-sided test)
z F test statistic and the associated p-value in the parentheses.
31Table 4: Estimated coe±cient of sex ratio and assets at marriage, controlling for the
current household income and assets and the year of marriage
Individual Household
expenditure expenditure
Variable Enrollment (in million)] (in million)
(A) Urban Areas
Sex ratio .088 .238¤ 1.229¤
(.430) (.062) (.389)
Mother's assets at marriage£10¡9 -.539 .228¤ .359¤¤
(.691) (.022) (.139)
Father's assets at marriage£10¡9 .856¤ -.071¤ .513
(.140) (.022) (.547)
Joint signi¯cance of asset coe±cients 37.21y 59.55z 3.52z
(.000) (.000) (.030)
Joint signi¯cance of sex ratio and 45.55y 40.88z 4.14z
asset coe±cients (.000) (.000) (.006)
No. of observations 2654 1379 1242
(B) Rural Areas
Sex ratio -.746¤¤ .037 -.011
(.376) (.022) (.092)
Mother's assets at marriage£10¡9 55.254 .809 -4.313
(50.881) (.864) (5.253)
Father's assets at marriage£10¡9 -4.754 -.118 -.369¤¤¤
(3.798) (.119) (.189)
Joint signi¯cance of asset coe±cients 2.77y 0.98z 2.09z
(.250) (.377) (.124)
Joint signi¯cance of sex ratio and 6.58y 2.00z 1.40z
asset coe±cients (.087) (.112) (.241)
No. of observations 3031 1786 1608
Note: Robust standard errors corrected for within-household correlations are in the
parentheses.
¤p < :01; ¤¤:01 · p < :05; ¤¤¤:05 · p < :10: (two-sided test)
?p < :01; ??:01 · p < :05; ???:05 · p < :10: (one-sided test)
y Â2 Wald test statistic and the associated p-value in the parentheses.
z F test statistic and the associated p-value in the parentheses.
] The coe±cients are estimated by OLS using uncensored observations because Heckit procedures
fail to converge.




Variable Enrollment (in million)
(A) Urban areas
Sex ratio .112 .304¤
(.545) (.074)
Sex ratio -.097 -.112
£ female dummy (.656) (.083)
Mother's nonlabor income£10¡6 .402¤¤¤ .175¤
(.233) (.030)
Mother's nonlabor income£10¡6 -.802¤ -.018
£ female dummy (.286) (.064)
Father's nonlabor income£10¡6 .130¤¤ -.015
(.058) (.010)
Father's nonlabor income£10¡6 -.235¤ .011
£ female dummy (.071) (.012)
Female dummy .282 .120
(.690) (.084)
No. of observations 2765 1477
(B) Rural areas
Sex ratio -.419 .072¤¤
(.442) (.033)
Sex ratio -.718 -.060¤¤¤
£ female dummy (.574) (.035)
Mother's nonlabor income£10¡6 -.446 .0003
(.656) (.024)
Mother's nonlabor income£10¡6 .314 -.047
£ female dummy (.560) (.064)
Father's nonlabor income£10¡6 .102 -.009
(.083) (.007)
Father's nonlabor income£10¡6 -.045 .019
£ female dummy (.107) (.014)
Female dummy .754 .064
(.598) (.035)
No. of observations 3169 2064
Note: The variables listed in the note of Table 2, the household income,
and the household assets are included in the RHS.
Robust standard errors corrected for within-household correlation
are in the parenthesis.
¤p < :01; ¤¤:01 · p < :05; ¤¤¤:05 · p < :10:
33